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ETHOS AT THE INTERSECTION: CLASSICAL
INSIGHTS FOR CONTEMPORARY
APPLICATION
Melissa H. Weresh*
“[W]e seem able to approach ethos only within a set of paradoxes and . . .
contradictions.”1
Much has been written about ethos, or character, in rhetoric. Ethos as one
of the artistic proofs is an important consideration for persuasion and therefore
important for evaluating and crafting persuasive legal texts. By comparing and
synthesizing classical and contemporary notions of ethos, this Article will craft a
framework, or template, for examining ethos-based rhetorical strategies employed in persuasive documents. It will do so by first examining the classical rhetorical views of ethos from Isocrates, Aristotle, and Cicero. It will then compare
and contrast classical views with those of contemporary scholars to situate
ethotic appeal in written communication.
Two questions will guide the effort to locate ethotic appeal in persuasive
texts. The first is a longstanding debate about whether a speaker or writer must
possess ethos or good character, or whether ethotic appeal might be based upon
an appearance of ethos. The second, related question is another debatable concept within considerations of ethos—that of its dwelling. Does ethos dwell in the
speaker/writer? In the speech/text? Or in the exchange that takes place between
speaker/writer and the audience? A careful consideration of classical and contemporary notions of ethos reveals that it dwells in all of these places. Thus,
armed with an array of possible dwellings for ethotic appeal, and after considering modern conceptions of audience for written communication, this Article will
engage in a practical application: using a framework that emerges from the consideration of these questions to examine ethos-based rhetorical strategies in a legal text.
“Ethos . . . shifts and changes over time, across texts, and around competing
spaces.”2

* Dwight D. Opperman Distinguished Professor of Law, Drake University Law School. The
author would like to thank the following colleagues for their helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this Article: Mark Hannah, Brian Larson, Kristen Tiscione, Karen Wallace, and
Laura Webb. I would also like to thank the Classical Rhetoric/Contemporary Law (CRCL)
working group, the William S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV, and the Nevada Law Journal
for hosting a wonderful Classical Rhetoric as a Lens for Contemporary Legal Praxis symposium, which gave rise to this Article.
1 ETHOS: NEW ESSAYS IN RHETORICAL AND CRITICAL THEORY xxvi (James S. Baumlin & Tita French Baumlin eds., 1994).
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INTRODUCTION
Classical rhetoricians such as Isocrates, Aristotle, and Cicero addressed the
notion of ethos in persuasion.3 Their focus was on ethotic appeal in spoken
communication.4 Modern rhetorical theories often turn the lens to written
communication.5 The focus of this Article is to use the advice of classical and
contemporary scholars of ethos to craft a template for examining ethotic appeal
in a legal text. That will (eventually) be this Article’s goal as it considers
ethotic appeal in Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent from the denial of certiorari in
Pennsylvania v. Dunlap.6
Such an endeavor raises two initial, intertwined questions about the advice
from the classics—ones that have also been examined by modern scholars.
First, is ethos something that is possessed by the speaker/writer, or is it something that the speaker/writer merely projects? This Article will address the possession/appearance debate first, but it will not resolve it, as this question is likely compounded by the second question: Where does ethos dwell?
Maddeningly, or perhaps wisely,7 this Article will also address but not resolve
this question, as to resolve either question prioritizes one theory at the expense
of others, potentially depriving scholars of potential dwellings for ethos and potential considerations for ethotic appeal. Thus, this Article will address both
questions, attempting not to resolve them definitively, but to explore the theory
underlying posited answers, which will then be used to craft a framework, or
template, for examining ethotic appeal in a text.
In Part I, this Article will examine the question of ethotic possession or appearance, considering classical and contemporary positions.8 Then, in Part II,
this Article will consider the question of where ethos dwells.9 This question
will also be examined from classical and contemporary positions, with speaker/writer, speech/text, and the exchange between speaker/writer and audience
as potential ethotic dwellings.10 Turning the attention to an application of persuasive ethotic appeal in written communication, Part III will address modern
3

See infra Parts I, II.
See infra Part I.
5 See generally James S. Baumlin & Craig A. Meyer, Positioning Ethos in/for the TwentyFirst Century: An Introduction to Histories of Ethos, 7, 78 HUMAN. 1 (2018).
6 See Pennsylvania v. Dunlap, 555 U.S. 964, 964–67 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
7 I am not the first to choose an approach that refuses to prioritize one theory or conclusion
over another. See, e.g., Andrea A. Lunsford & Lisa S. Ede, Classical Rhetoric, Modern
Rhetoric, and Contemporary Discourse Studies, 1 WRITTEN COMM. 78, 79 (1984) [hereinafter Lunsford & Ede, Classical Rhetoric]. The authors acknowledge, “[v]aluable time and
scholarly energies are often wasted as champions of different methodologies within a single
discipline try to convince one another that theirs is the only acceptable approach.” Id.
8 See infra Part I.
9 See infra Part II.
10
See infra Part II.
4
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notions of audience.11 Finally, in Part IV, this Article will present a novel template for evaluating ethos-based rhetorical strategies in the posited loci from
Part II, and then use that template to evaluate ethotic appeal in a legal text.12
I.

ETHOS IN THE CLASSICAL VIEW: POSSESSION OR APPEARANCE?

Isocrates, Aristotle, and Cicero each addressed the concept of ethos in persuasion.13 Their viewpoints and corresponding advice differ, however, in
whether a speaker must possess good character, or whether ethotic persuasion
may rest on projecting an appearance of good character.14 The question of possession or appearance, and the advice offered by classical rhetoricians on how
to evince ethos, will provide the foundation for the subsequent consideration of
where ethos dwells.15 The theories underlying posited answers to these questions will undergird the suggested framework for examining a text for ethotic
appeal.16
For Isocrates, ethos was the actual character of the rhetor, and ethotic appeal was therefore dependent on prior reputation.17 Thus, in Isocrates’s view,
ethos was possessed. Aristotle’s position was that ethos existed in the speaking
event, and was therefore projected during the event rather than dependent on
some prior notion of the speaker.18 For Aristotle, the appearance of ethos in the
speaking event was a mark of persuasion.19 Finally, for Cicero, while his advice on ethos would suggest a view akin to that of Aristotle, the Roman notion
of character as an inherent and immutable characteristic suggests that, for Cicero, ethos was both possession and appearance.20 In this Part, this Article examines the advice of the classic rhetoricians for evincing ethos so as to further our
understanding of this artistic proof of persuasion.
A. Isocrates: Possession
Isocrates was one of the Ten Attic Orators, whose status in Athenian culture was well recognized.21 In Isocrates’s view, possession of ethos was essential to persuasion.22 In fact, according to Isocrates, it was a man’s prior reputa-

11

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
13 See infra Sections I.A–C, II.A.1, II.B.1, II.C.1.
14 See infra Part I.
15 See infra Part II.
16 See generally infra Section III.B and accompanying notes.
17 See infra Section I.A and accompanying notes.
18 See infra Section I.B.
19 See infra Section I.B.
20 See infra Section I.C and accompanying notes.
21 Attic Orators, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF THE CLASSICAL WORLD (John Roberts ed., 2007);
see also GEORGE KENNEDY, THE ART OF PERSUASION IN GREECE 125 (1963).
22
Isocrates advises:
12
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tion that established his ethos.23 Isocrates distinguished the persuasive appeal
of words spoken by an “honorable” man, one “of good repute,” from the inferior speech of “men who live under a cloud.”24 And, in Isocrates’s view, possession of ethos—being an honorable man rather than merely projecting the appearance of honor—was essential for ethotic appeal.
Isocrates emphasized that “the argument which is made by a man’s life is
of more weight than that which is furnished by words[.]”25 He stressed that:
[P]robabilities and proofs and all forms of persuasion support only the points in
a case to which they are severally applied, whereas an honorable reputation not
only lends greater persuasiveness to the words of the man who possesses it, but
adds greater lustre to his deeds, and is, therefore, more zealously to be sought after by men of intelligence than anything else in the world.26

Isocrates also situated character in the man, developed prior to the
speech.27 Ethos was therefore necessarily prediscursive.28 “[F]or Isocrates, the
power of character preceded and underlay the power of speech. Nothing mediated between them, and, for philosophical and political reasons as well as for
rhetorical reasons, effective persuasion relied on good character.”29
Grounding his theory of ethos as possession as opposed to appearance was
consistent with Isocrates’s disdain for the Sophists, a group of traveling teachers whose work received both positive and negative reactions.30 While Isocra[T]he man who wishes to persuade people will not be negligent as to the matter of character; no,
on the contrary, he will apply himself above all to establish a most honorable name among his
fellow-citizens; for who does not know that words carry greater conviction when spoken by men
of good repute than when spoken by men who live under a cloud . . . .

ISOCRATES, ANTIDOSIS § 15, 278, reprinted in PERSEUS DIGITAL LIBRARY (George Nolin ed.,
1980), http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0144
%3Aspeech%3D15%3Asection%3D278 [https://perma.cc/5A9Z-9SM2] (last visited Mar. 5,
2020).
23 See id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at § 15, 280, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A
1999.01.0144%3Aspeech%3D15%3Asection%3D280 [https://perma.cc/3XHJ-QZK7] (last
visited Mar. 5, 2020).
27 See William Benoit, Isocrates and Aristotle on Rhetoric, 20 RHETORIC SOC. Q. 251, 257
(1990) (emphasizing how Isocrates “juxtaposes the ‘argument which is made by a man’s
life’ with ‘that which is furnished by words’ ”).
28 Modern scholars have referred to this prior reputation ethos as “prediscursive ethos[,]” or
that which precedes discourse. See, e.g., Ruth Amossy, Ethos at the Crossroads of Disciplines: Rhetoric, Pragmatics, Sociology, 22 POETICS TODAY 1, 7 (2001) (explaining “prediscursive ethos”).
29 J. Christopher Rideout, Ethos, Character, and Discoursal Self in Persuasive Legal Writing, 21 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 19, 29 (2016) [hereinafter Rideout, Discoursal Self].
30 Sophists, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO CLASSICAL CIVILIZATION 669, 673 (Simon Hornblower et al. eds., 2d ed. 2014). The text explains that positive views of the Sophists can be
demonstrated by their successful careers and “considerable demand for their services, especially in providing rhetorical training for aspiring politicians.” Id. In contrast, conservatives
viewed the Sophists “as subversive of morality and tradition, in view both of their natural-
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tes did study under the Sophist Gorgias,31 he was critical of the manipulative
tactics of the Sophists,32 believing that his approach to rhetoric was more a
program of character development and an endeavor of political discourse.33 It is
therefore consistent with Isocrates’s disdain for the artifice of the Sophists that
he would insist on ethos in the actual character of the speaker, rather than in the
speaker’s ability to merely present himself as a man of good repute.34
B. Aristotle: Appearance
While Aristotle was also critical of the Sophists,35 in The Rhetoric he
moved away from the possession view of Isocrates and toward a view of ethos
that allows for the projection of good character. As one scholar observes:
If Isocratean tradition asserts the speaker’s need to be good, Aristotelian tradition asserts the sufficiency of seeming good. For the former, discourse becomes
istic outlook on morality and religion, and of their teaching (especially to the young) of
techniques of argument.” Id. Isocrates himself contrasted his view of character with that held
by the Sophists in the following passage:
And yet those who desire to follow the true precepts of this discipline may, if they will, be
helped more speedily towards honesty of character than towards facility in oratory. And let no
one suppose that I claim that just living can be taught; for, in a word, I hold that there does not
exist an art of the kind which can implant sobriety and justice in depraved natures. Nevertheless,
I do think that the study of political discourse can help more than any other thing to stimulate
and form such qualities of character.

ISOCRATES, AGAINST THE SOPHISTS § 13, 21, reprinted in PERSEUS DIGITAL LIBRARY (George
Nolin ed., 1980), http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A
1999.01.0144%3Aspeech%3D13%3Asection%3D21 [https://perma.cc/GYF2-F3LQ] (last
visited Mar. 5, 2020).
31 Rideout, Discoursal Self, supra note 29, at 27 (noting that “Isocrates lived from 436 to
338 B.C., which allowed him to study under the great Sophist Gorgias.”).
32 Id. (explaining that in Isocrates’s speech, Against the Sophists, Isocrates “attack[ed] the
pretensions of the Sophists . . . .”).
33 Id. (referring to Isocrates’s view of his own system as one of the development of “civic
knowledge and the art of political discourse, as a way of improving the welfare of the Greek
state.”).
34 Id. at 27–28. Rideout explains Isocrates’s disregard for the character of the Sophists, noting that
Isocrates distanced himself from the Sophists by attacking them as pretentious and arrogant in
their claim to know all that is necessary for happiness, prosperity, and success; as eager for
money at the expense of their students; and as teaching persuasion as a set of inflexible rules,
without regard for the way that experience must further guide the appropriate uses of persuasion.

Id. This then led to Isocrates’s own straightforward view of ethos: “[F]or Isocrates, good
character was an uncomplicated matter of possession—the good orator and writer quite
simply possessed good character.” Id. at 30.
35 See, e.g., Martin D. Carcieri, A Progressive Reply to the ACLU on Proposition 209, 39
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 141, 161 n.79 (1998) (noting that “much of Plato and Aristotle’s intellectual project was to expose the flaws in the work of the Sophists, those colorful itinerant
teachers of manners and oratory whose educational revolution both advanced and undermined classical Athenian democracy” and that “Aristotle’s basic response to the Sophists
was that they abused logic by failing to make appropriate distinctions of kind and degree
with respect to the subject matter under discussion.”).
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a revelation of character; for the latter, discourse becomes an active construction
of character—or, rather, of an image, a representation of character—and Aristotelian theory seeks to outline the means whereby such image-making is
achieved.36

In Aristotle’s view, ethos was discursive.37 He stressed that:
The character [ethos] of the speaker is a cause of persuasion when the speech is
so uttered as to make him worthy of belief; for as a rule we trust men of probity
more, and more quickly, about things in general, while on points outside the
realm of exact knowledge, where opinion is divided, we trust them absolutely. 38

Because Aristotle did not insist on the possession of good character, but
emphasized how to project good character, it was essential that ethos be situated in the speech, rather than in some prior reputation of the speaker. Aristotle
advised:
This trust, however, should be created by the speech itself, and not left to depend upon an antecedent impression that the speaker is this or that kind of man.
It is not true, as some writers on the art maintain, that the probity of the speaker
contributes nothing to his persuasiveness; on the contrary, we might almost affirm that his character [ethos] is the most potent of all the means to persuasion.39

Aristotle’s position thereby rejects the notion of Isocrates, that ethos is a
pre-existing character or reputation, and rather situates the character of the
speaker in the speech itself, as an element of the discourse.40 To the extent that
The Rhetoric was an attempt to systematize persuasion, ethos had to be addressed as something the speaker constructs in the speech, rather than some
prior reputation:41
36

ETHOS: NEW ESSAYS IN RHETORICAL AND CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 1, at xv.
See Amossy, supra note 28, at 2 n.3 (emphasizing Aristotle’s discursive ethos).
38 ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC (1356a), in THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE: AN EXPANDED
TRANSLATION WITH SUPPLEMENTARY EXAMPLES FOR STUDENTS OF COMPOSITION AND PUBLIC
SPEAKING 8 (Lane Cooper trans., 1960) [hereinafter THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE] (alteration in original).
39 Id. at 8–9.
40 See Perry S. Bechky, Lemkin’s Situation: Toward a Rhetorical Understanding of Genocide, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 551, 600 n.283 (2012) (“Kennedy explains: Aristotle thus does not
include in rhetorical ethos the authority that a speaker may possess due to his position in
government or society, previous actions, reputation for wisdom, or anything except what is
actually contained in the speech and the character it reveals. Presumably, he would regard all
other factors, sometimes highly important in the success of rhetoric, as inartistic; but he never says so.”); Rideout, Discoursal Self, supra note 29, at 30 (explaining that Aristotle “in
effect re-locates the character of the speaker inside the speech, rendering the speaker ‘an element of the discourse itself, no longer simply its origin.’ In doing so, he points the way to a
more modern view of ethos.”).
41 Rideout explains that Aristotle
37

[D]oes so partly because prior reputation (“previous opinion”) would be implied, but also because he wanted to emphasize what was in the speech, rather than what was external to it. Also,
if Greek litigants represented themselves, they would often lack external authority; hence the
importance of establishing character in the speech itself.

Rideout, Discoursal Self, supra note 29, at 32; see also Craig R. Smith, Ethos Dwells Pervasively: A Hermeneutic Reading of Aristotle on Credibility, in THE ETHOS OF RHETORIC 1, 5
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[T]he speaker must not merely see to it that his speech [as an argument] shall be
convincing and persuasive, but he must [in and by the speech] give the right impression of himself, and get his judge [audience] into the right state of mind. . . .
[F]or in conducing to persuasion it is highly important that the speaker should
evince a certain character, and that the judges should conceive him to be disposed towards them in a certain way, and further, if possible, that the judges
themselves should have a certain attitude towards him.42

When addressing the qualities that instill ethos, Aristotle couched advice in
terms of appearance,43 recommending that the orator evince “intelligence,
character, and goodwill”44 and emphasizing that “[t]hat is a complete list of the
possibilities. It necessarily follows that the speaker who is thought to have all
these qualities [intelligence, character, and good will] has the confidence of his
hearers.”45
Because, in Aristotle’s view, ethos is situated in the speech, his advice on
style emphasizes ethotic appeal.46 In addressing lexis, or style, Aristotle “affirms character as a rhetorical construct.”47 He emphasizes that, with regard to
propriety, “[y]our language will be appropriate, if it expresses (1) emotion and
(2) character, and if it is (3) in proportion with the subject.”48 With regard to
the presentation of character through emotion and fact, he advises, “this display
of the facts through these external signs will make your style appropriate to
character [to the persons of your story], since each class of men, each type of
disposition, has a language suited to it.”49
With regard to style, Aristotle counseled:
There is an opportune use, and an inopportune, for all these rules of style. A corrective for every excess is the time-worn trick of self-criticism while you are
speaking; the audience thinks that the style is right since the speaker evidently
knows what he is doing. Further, it is best not to keep all the proportions going
at once, or the hearer will not be deceived. [—He will see your artfulness, and
be on his guard.]50

Aristotle’s rejection of the artifice of the Sophists is reflected in his advice
on presentation, noting that a speaker should “[p]resent yourself from the outset
(Michael J. Hyde ed., 2004) [hereinafter Smith, Ethos Dwells Pervasively] (“[E]thos was
about building the credibility of a speaker before an audience, not about the speaker’s inherent worth.”).
42 THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at 91 (1378a).
43 See Rideout, Discoursal Self, supra note 29, at 32 (“Here Aristotle continues to step away
from the tradition established by Isocrates—away from the speaker’s need to be good and
toward the sufficiency of seeming to be good. And here again, Aristotle presents ethos as the
product of rhetorical artifice, one where the speaker must ‘construct a view of himself.’ ”).
44 THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at 92 (1378a).
45 Id.
46 See Rideout, Discoursal Self, supra note 29, at 33.
47 Id.
48 THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at 197 (1408a1).
49 Id. at 198 (1408a3).
50
Id. at 198 (1408b).
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in a distinctive light, so that the audience may regard you as a person of this
sort, your opponent as of that; only do not betray your design. It is easy to give
the right impression.”51 So, ethos, in Aristotle’s rendering in The Rhetoric, is
appearance, situated in the speech, rather than possession.52
C. Cicero: Appearance and Possession
Cicero expounded on the work of Aristotle, emphasizing the importance of
projecting ethos. He advised that advocates should adopt “a mild tone, a countenance expressive of modesty, [and] gentle language . . . .”53 Like Aristotle,
Cicero warned advocates against revealing their artifice, cautioning them
against disclosing their true motives and advising them to project an image of
“seeming to be dealing reluctantly and under compulsion with something you
are really anxious to prove.”54 He provided advice on evincing ethos in speech,
noting that:
[M]uch is done by good taste and style in speaking, [so] that the speech seems to
depict the speaker’s character. For by means of particular types of thought and
diction, and the employment besides of a delivery that is unruffled and eloquent
of good-nature, the speakers are made to appear upright, well-bred and virtuous
men.55

Notwithstanding this advice, which suggests ethos as appearance rather
than possession, the Roman view of character presentation also had an element
of possession for rhetorical ethos.56 As James May explains, Cicero’s view of

51

Id. at 231 (1417b); see also Michael H. Frost, With Amici Like These: Cicero, Quintilian
and the Importance of Stylistic Demeanor, 3 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 5, 13
(2006) (emphasizing, with respect to the quoted passage, “at the risk of appearing to encourage duplicity and trickery, Aristotle warned advocates against inadvertently betraying their
manipulative intentions . . . .”).
52 Rideout, Discoursal Self, supra note 29, at 34 (“Modern commentators almost wholly
agree that Aristotle moved his view of ethos beyond the traditional sense—of ethos as a
quality of the speaker’s actual character, something that would attach to reputation—to
something that is much more a matter of rhetorical competence, established not through reputation but rather within the speech itself.”); see also Janja Žmavc, The Ethos of Classical
Rhetoric: From Epieikeia to Auctoritas, in TOPICAL THEMES IN ARGUMENTATION THEORY:
TWENTY EXPLORATORY STUDIES 181, 184 (Frans. H. van Eemeren & Bart Garssen eds.,
2012) (“What is significant in Aristotle’s conceptualization of phronesis, arête and eunoia
as a part of rhetorical ethos is the function that he assigns to this persuasion strategy—
when the speech is spoken in such way, a speaker becomes trustworthy.”).
53 2 CICERO, DE ORATORE 182–83, in CICERO DE ORATORE 327, 329 (E.W. Sutton trans.,
1959).
54 Id. at 329 (182).
55 Id. at 329 (184) (emphasis added).
56 Žmavc, supra note 52, at 186. Žmavc emphasizes the difference between Greek and Roman orators. The author notes that “[t]he goal of a Greek speaker was more or less to construct a credible self image within the speech and/or at the same time gain the goodwill of
the audience. However, his preexisting image generally did not interfere with argumentation . . . .” Id. In contrast,
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ethos was necessarily and “radically influenced and conditioned by the idiosyncrasies of the sociopolitical environment of Republican Rome as well as by
the demands of the Roman judicial system.”57 In Rome, character was an important and essential element of the social and political structure and was an
inherent characteristic.58 Therefore, notwithstanding Cicero’s advice on evincing ethos, in the Roman view ethos was, in part, an immutable characteristic of
a person.59 As a result, “[a]long with the adopted Greek ethotic elements, a
character presentation of a Roman speaker is always a preexisting social category that consists of entirely Roman elements as well.”60
May addresses the specific way in which Cicero diverges from Aristotle
vis-à-vis ethos:
The ethos defined by Aristotle as an entechnic source of proof demands explication only within the context of the speech; it is neither the speaker’s authority
nor his previous reputation, but the impression he makes during his speech, that
inspires trust in his listeners. Such restrictions upon ethos would have been incomprehensible to a Roman steeped in the tradition of the mos maiorum, surrounded by a nobility of rank, and influenced by the culture’s general assumptions concerning human nature and character. The Roman view is succinctly, if
somewhat obliquely expressed by Cicero in De Oratore: “Feelings are won over
by a man’s dignity (dignitas), achievements (res gestae), and reputation (existimatio)” (2.182). Aristotle’s conception of an ethos portrayed only through the
medium of a speech was, for the Roman orator, neither acceptable nor adequate.61

In addition to the impact of Roman social and political construct on the
ethos of Cicero, differences in the Roman and Greek advocacy practices also
impacted the Ciceronian view of ethos. In Greece, litigants often represented
themselves, occasionally hiring a logographer or speechwriter to prepare the

[s]omething completely different is true for the so called Roman rhetorical ethos: as a rhetorical
strategy it almost entirely consists of the speaker’s preexisting reputation and the authority that
comes from it. In Roman judicial oratory this kind of rhetorical ethos was not only a part of argumentation, but often presented its main feature; in funeral oratory ethos presented the central
and crucial element that substantiated the purpose of a funeral speech . . . .

Id.
57

JAMES M. MAY, TRIALS OF CHARACTER: THE ELOQUENCE OF CICERONIAN ETHOS 6
(1988).
58 Id. (emphasizing that “[c]haracter was an extraordinarily important element in the social
and political milieu of Republican Rome” and that “[t]he Romans believed that character
remains essentially constant in man and therefore demands or determines his actions.”).
59 Id. (stressing that “[s]ince character does not evolve or develop, but rather is bestowed or
inherited by nature, an individual cannot suddenly, or at will, change or disguise for any
lengthy period his ethos or his way of life; nor is it wise to attempt such alteration.”).
60 Žmavc, supra note 52, at 187.
61
MAY, supra note 57, at 9.
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speech.62 In contrast, in Rome, litigants were more likely to be represented by
an advocate.63
As a result of this aspect of Greek advocacy practice, it is not surprising
that Aristotle does not distinguish between speaker and client when addressing
ethotic appeal.64 Cicero on the other hand does address such a distinction in the
following passage, which is important in the consideration of ethos as either
possessed or projected:
A potent factor in success, then, is for the characters, principles, conduct and
course of life, both of those who are to plead cases and of their clients, to be approved, and conversely those of their opponents condemned; and for the feelings
of the tribunal to be won over, as far as possible, to goodwill towards the advocate and the advocate’s client as well.65

Cicero goes on in this passage to instruct the advocate in crafting the ethos
of client, advocate, and opponent, emphasizing an intersection of ethotic possession and appearance: “Now feelings are won over by a man’s merit,
achievements or reputable life, qualifications easier to embellish, if only they
are real, than to fabricate where nonexistent.”66 Notwithstanding this emphasis
on possession, he provides instruction on the presentation of ethotic appeal:
But attributes useful in an advocate are a mild tone, a countenance expressive of
modesty, gentle language, and the faculty of seeming to be dealing reluctantly
and under compulsion with something you are really anxious to prove. It is very
helpful to display the tokens of good-nature, kindness, calmness, loyalty and a
disposition that is pleasing and not grasping or covetous, and all the qualities belonging to men who are upright, unassuming and not given to haste, stubbornness, strife or harshness, are powerful in winning goodwill, while the want of
them estranges it from such as do not possess them; accordingly the very opposites of these qualities must be ascribed to our opponents.67

62

Id. at 9–10 (noting that such a practice posed challenges including that of “composing a
speech that would prove not only persuasive in its argument but also appropriate and consistent with the litigant’s character.”).
63 Id. at 10 (explaining that, in Rome, “a more common practice was to enlist one or several
patroni to plead the case.”).
64 See JAKOB WISSE, ETHOS AND PATHOS: FROM ARISTOTLE TO CICERO 32 (1989). Wisse asserts that “Aristotle supposes the speaker to be the litigant himself, and never mentions
(ethos of) clients. This reflects the basic situation in Athenian court practice, where one was
supposed to speak for oneself, even if there were many situations in which the use of an advocate was permitted.” Id.
65 2 CICERO, supra note 53, at 327 (182); see also WISSE, supra note 64, at 229. Wisse translates the same passage as follows:
Well then, it is a very important contribution to winning a case that approval should be given to
the character, the habits, the deeds and the life, both of those who plead the case and of those on
whose behalf they plead, and that these characteristics of the opponents are likewise disapproved
of; and that the minds of the audience are, as much as possible, won over to feel sympathy towards the orator as well as towards the person the orator is speaking for.
66
67

2 CICERO, supra note 53, at 327 (182).
Id. at 327, 329 (182–83). Wisse offers a similar translation:
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May explains how such Roman oratory customs, coupled with the Roman
emphasis on both appearance and possession of ethos, resulted in a dizzying
array of points for ethotic emphasis.68 Noting that, within this passage, “the
extension of the sphere of ethos is . . . striking,” May explains how the “realm
of ethos” extends to “the characters of the patronus, the client, the adversary,
his patronus, and the judges as well.”69 By way of this extension, “[a]ctors and
opportunities for artistic variation have multiplied.”70
Cicero thus “present[s] rhetorical ethos as a ‘confluence of notions of a
speaker’s social role’ and as a ‘synthesis of’ several Greek and traditional
Roman ‘concepts that interact in different ways.’ ”71 This observation, that
rhetorical ethos can be viewed from the perspective of a variety of personas
and from the interaction between those personas, leads to our next inquiry
which is, where does ethos dwell?
II. ETHOS IN THE CLASSICAL VIEW: DWELLING PLACE?
An examination of the location of ethos, or the inquiry into where ethos
lives or dwells, seems reasonable, as German philosopher Martin Heidegger
asserted that the Aristotelian notion of ethos as character had a more primal ancestry in ethos as haunt, or dwelling place.72 While a philosophical considera[T]he effect of these things is enhanced by a mild tone of voice on the part of the orator, the intimation of restraint by the expression on his face, and kindliness in the use of his words: and, if
you press some point somewhat vigorously, by seeming to act against your inclination, because
you are forced to do so. It is very useful that signs should be given of flexibility, magnanimity,
mildness, respectfulness, gratefulness, of not being desirous or greedy; and all these things typical of people decent and unassuming, not severe, not obstinate, not litigious, not harsh, really
win sympathy, and alienate the audience from such as do not possess them. And these same considerations must likewise be employed to ascribe the opposite qualities to the opponents.

WISSE, supra note 64, at 229–30. Wisse acknowledges but disputes competing interpretations. Id. at 232 (describing one approach as “implausible from the start.”); see also MAY,
supra note 57, at 10. May’s interpretation of this passage includes the following advice:
A potent factor in success, then, is for the characters, principles, deeds and course of life, both of
those who are to plead cases and of their clients, to be approved, and conversely those of their
opponents condemned; and for the feelings of the judges to be won over, as far as possible, to
goodwill towards the advocate and the advocate’s client as well.
68

See MAY, supra note 57, at 10.
Id.
70 Id.
71 Žmavc, supra note 52, at 189 (citation omitted) (asserting further that “such an interaction of concepts, which extends from different social roles to diverse discursive practices
and theoretical models of ancient rhetoricians and philosophers, is perhaps the best way to
understand rhetorical ethos.”).
72 Baumlin & Meyer, supra note 5, at 12. The authors explain, “From the Homeric ‘habitats
of horses,’ Heidegger carries ethos into the ‘abodes of men,’ where Being is revealed,
known, cared for, and preserved.” See Smith, Ethos Dwells Pervasively, supra note 41, at 2.
Smith asserts that:
69

For Aristotle, it is a given: everyone has ethos whether it be noble or ignoble. Before one even
speaks, that ethos has an ontological dimension because it emerges from the way one makes decisions, the way one lives on a day-to-day basis, the way one dwells. . . . Thus, Aristotle assumes
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tion of ethos as being is beyond the scope of this Article, this Article’s interest
in developing ethos in written communication does warrant a consideration of
the location or dwelling place of ethos. This raises the following questions:
Does ethos reside in the speaker/writer? In the speech/text? Or in the exchange
between speaker/writer and audience?
Similarly exploring these questions, in “Positioning Ethos in/for the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction to Histories of Ethos,” James Baumlin and
Craig Meyer raise the following inquiries:
[C]ontemporary theory—as reflected in textual criticism, media and communication studies, gender studies, law, theology, anthropology, sociology, psychology, ethics, politics, economics, even ecology—continues the fight over meanings and applications. Is ethos a verbal behavior or the “dwelling place” that
contains such behavior? Does it belong to the speaker or to the audience (or to
both, or to neither)? Does it dwell in the space “between” rhetor and audience?
Is it a directed, symbolic action or a dialogic transaction? Is it revealed or constructed by means of speech? (Does it pre-exist speech? Does it “exist” at all?)73

Baumlin and Meyer point to the troublesome issue of language and translation, noting that, as with many Greek terms, there is no definitive translation
for ethos.74 Consequent ambiguity has given rise to myriad interpretations,
ranging from “rational ethos,”75 “ethos of sympathy,”76 “generative ethos,”77
the knowledge of the Athenian fore-structure of ethos as a dwelling place and then reformulates
the notion of dwelling place to present a rhetorical understanding of ethos.
73

Baumlin & Meyer, supra note 5, at 4.
Id. (“Like many terms from Greek philosophy (logos, pistis, kairos, to give a few) ethos
remains untranslatable in any word-for-word correspondence.”) (The authors note, “Numerous terms gesture in its direction, though no one word or phrase captures its nuances in English. Character, authority, charisma, credence, credibility, trust, trustworthiness, sincerity,
‘good sense,’ goodwill, expertise, reliability, authenticity, subjectivity, ‘the subject,’ self,
selfhood, self-identity, image, reputation, cultural identity, habit, habitus, habituation, person, persona, impersonation, performance, self-fashioning, voice, personal style: these make
for a sampling of stand-in terms.”); see also WISSE, supra note 64, at 6. Wisse addressed
possible connections between logos, ethos, and pathos, initially asserting that logos connects
with the message, pathos connects with the effect of the message on the audience, and ethos
connecting with the speaker. Id. Nonetheless, he found such lines difficult to maintain. Thus,
reflecting on the proposed differentiations, Wisse then posed the following questions, which
align well with those this Article considers:
74

(i) Is ethos concerned with the character of the speaker only (whether he is speaking for himself
or on behalf of someone else), or is it extended to cover the client’s character also for cases
where the speaker is an advocate?
(ii) What qualities of the speaker (and client) fall under the scope of ethos?
(iii) Is there any connection between ethos and pathos?
(iv) Besides positive character-drawing regarding speaker (and client), does ethos comprise its
negative counterpart regarding the opponent(s)?

Id. at 7.
75 Baumlin & Meyer, supra note 5, at 4 (citing WISSE, supra note 64).
76 Id. (citing WISSE, supra note 64).
77 Id. (citing Jim W. Corder, Varieties of Ethical Argument, With Some Account of the Significance of Ethos in the Teaching of Composition, 6 FRESHMAN ENG. NEWS 1 (1978)).
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“ethos of citizenship,”78 “scientific ethos,”79 “cyborg ethos,”80 “narrative
ethos,”81 “intertextual ethos,”82 “photographic ethos,”83 “feminist ethos,”84
“queer ethos,”85 and “ethos of the subaltern.”86
Notwithstanding this array of ethotic possibility, Baumlin and Meyer
acknowledge that, in connection with the listed concepts above, there are “patterns” to these varied inquiries: “Some terms point to the existential components of ethos; some to its sociological/cultural expressions; some to its linguistic/discursive praxis.”87 The authors point out that:
[A]ny adequate “map” or model of ethos will include a version of self and of its
relation to culture and language. Equally important is the insight that each theory orients itself from (and, in so doing, privileges) one of three perspectives: that
of self, or of culture, or of language.88

The range of these conceptualizations suggests that one cannot—and likely
should not—situate ethos definitively.
This Article therefore will not ultimately land on a definitive “place” for
ethos to dwell or to be situated, but, again, the inquiry is not for naught. Because, after all, “[t]he question to be answered is not ‘how do we get beyond
these theories to the truth they aspire to . . . ?’ but ‘what do the debates and
theories themselves tell us about where we are placed in the history of culture
and meaning-making?’ ”89 With that flexibility (and freedom) in mind, this Article will consider what both classic and modern scholars have to say about the
potential dwelling places of ethos, including the ethos in the speaker/writer, in
the speech/document, and in the exchange between speaker/writer and the audience.
78

Id. (citing STEPHEN K. WHITE, THE ETHOS OF A LATE-MODERN CITIZEN (2009)).
Id. (citing ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1973)).
80 Id. (citing Michael W. DeLashmutt, Posthumanism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION AND
FILM 354–61 (2011)).
81 Id. (citing LIESBETH KOTHALS ALTES, ETHOS AND NARRATIVE INTERPRETATION: THE
NEGOTIATION OF VALUES IN FICTION (2014)).
82
Id. (citing John Oddo, The Chief Prosecutor and the Iraqi Regime: Intertextual Ethos and
Transitive Chains of Authority, in INTERTEXTUALITY AND THE 24-HOUR NEWS CYCLE: A DAY
IN THE RHETORICAL LIFE OF COLIN POWELL’S U.N. ADDRESS 45–76 (2014)).
83 Id. (citing Kristie S. Fleckenstein, A Reformer Rides: Radical Photographic Ethos in
Frances E. Willard’s A Wheel within a Wheel, in RETHINKING ETHOS: A FEMINIST
ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO RHETORIC 26–49 (Kathleen J. Ryan et al. eds., 2016)).
84 Id. (citing Valerie Palmer-Mehta, Andrea Dworkin’s Radical Ethos, in RETHINKING
ETHOS: A FEMINIST ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO RHETORIC 50–70 (Kathleen J. Ryan et al.
eds., 2016)).
85 Id. (citing STACEY WAITE, THE UNAVAILABLE MEANS OF PERSUASION: A QUEER ETHOS
FOR FEMINIST WRITERS AND TEACHERS 71–88 (Kathleen J. Ryan et al. eds., 2016)).
86 Id. (citing Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271–313 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988)).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89
Id. at 3.
79
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A. Ethos in the Speaker
As noted in the initial inquiry, modern and classical rhetoricians considered ethos as either possessed within or projected by the speaker. Here, this Article will further explore classical and contemporary notions of ethos as an aspect of the speaker/writer, as an aspect of the speech/text, and as an aspect or
product of the exchange between speaker/writer and audience. The reader will
see, however, that clear demarcations between these posited loci are difficult to
maintain.
1. Classical Notions of Ethos in the Speaker
To trace a component of ethos in the actual character of the speaker, this
Article must return to Isocrates, for whom ethos was prediscursive and was a
person’s character, rather than something a person projected during the
speech.90 In Isocrates’s view, “discourse becomes entirely an index of the individual’s moral health and is gauged not simply by the way one speaks but by
the way one lives.”91 And, while Cicero clearly allows for the appearance of
ethos rather than possession, suggesting his target for the location of ethos
would be more squarely in the speech, Roman culture and its emphasis on the
credibility and immutability of reputation would suggest that ethos also dwells
in the speaker.92
2. Contemporary Notions of Ethos in the Speaker/Writer
Modern commentators have also examined prediscursive ethos in the character of the speaker, or self, in the context of ethos.93 These contemporary
views, however, further cloud the distinction between speaker/writer and
speech/text.

90

Michael J. Hyde, Introduction to THE ETHOS OF RHETORIC xv (Michael J. Hyde ed.,
2004). Hyde explains, “For Isocrates, rhetorical paideia, education and socialization, serves
the process of character development, but it is a person’s character itself, his stellar reputation, that anchors the persuasive capacity of rhetoric.” Id. (emphasis added).
91 ETHOS: NEW ESSAYS IN RHETORICAL AND CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 1, at xv.
92 See WISSE, supra note 64, at 245 (“[E]specially for a Roman, authority is part of most of
the attributes enumerated in the [De Oratore]: ‘character, habits, deeds and life,’ [and] ‘a
man’s worth, the things he has done, and an evaluation of his life.’ ”); supra Section I.C.
Wisse explains, “Of course, social authority played a much more important part in Roman
culture and society, where personal relations were often decisive factors in the course of
events, than in the democratic state of Athens, where such relations, if too openly used, were
often regarded with suspicion.” WISSE, supra note 64, at 245. Nonetheless, “[s]ince rhetorical theory, however, is in principle meant for all kinds of speakers, it is natural that the stress
should lie upon the means to apply ethos that are afforded by the speech itself, as, indeed, it
does in the last part of Cicero’s treatment . . . .” Id. Wisse therefore concludes that
“[a]uthority that is already present should therefore be regarded as a part of Cicero’s concept
of ethos.” Id. at 245–46.
93
See Baumlin & Meyer, supra note 5, at 3–7, 10–12, 22.
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a. Institutional Authority
Scholars have situated prediscursive ethos in the institutional authority of
the speaker/writer.94 In other words, in the character of the writer as derived
from the writer’s institutional position and the stereotype the audience associates with that authority.95
Ruth Amossy considers ethos through the lens of “rhetoric, pragmatics,
and sociology.”96 Drawing on notions of stereotype,97 Amossy argues that the
ethotic appeal of the speaker is constructed by the speaker who evinces an authoritative self and who also adapts her persona to the values and expectations
of the audience.98 In this way, Amossy does not limit ethos to the projected authority of the speaker—for our purposes, she does not limit ethotic appeal only
to the speaker. Rather, she finds ethotic appeal in the “crossroads,” both in the
authority constructed by the speaker and in the active processing of information
by the audience, which uses stereotype to call upon the ethos that exists within
those stereotypes.99 This results in what Amossy refers to as both discursive
authority and prediscursive institutional ethos.100
The institutional ethos derives from the institutional position of the speaker
and the authority associated with that position—in her view, the person author94

See, e.g., Amossy, supra note 28, at 9 (emphasizing that “[i]t is thus important to see how
the prior ethos, and the discursive ethos that integrates and reworks it, are related to the authority derived from an exterior institutional status.”).
95 Id. at 7–9.
96 Id. at 2 (“[T]he theory linking the efficacy of speech to the authority and credibility of the
orator traverses disciplines: it is to be found at the crossroads of rhetoric, pragmatics, and
sociology.”).
97 See id. at 7 (“Stereotyp[e] consists of perceiving and understanding the real through a
preexistent cultural representation, a fixed collective schema.”).
98 Id. at 8. Amossy explains, “the construction of the image of self which confers on the discourse a considerable part of its authority [is based on] [t]he orator adapt[ing] his or her selfpresentation to collective schemas which he or she believes are ratified and valued by the
target public.” Id.
99 Id. at 4–7 (explaining that “the institutional position of the orator and the degree of authority which this confers upon him contribute to the eliciting of a prior ethos. This prior
ethos, as part of the audience’s encyclopedic knowledge, is mobilized by the oral or written
speech in a specific situation of utterance.”). Id. at 19. Amossy’s model of ethos in the crossroads thus synthesizes pragmatic and sociological theories of ethos:
Within this framework, a rhetorical analysis that examines the ethos as a discursive, interactional
construction hinges on both pragmatics and sociology. Pragmatics allows the analysis to work
within discourse and to analyze the construction of ethos in terms of enunciation, of genre, and
of verbal strategies. Sociology allows the analysis to underscore not only the social dimension of
the discursive ethos (the collective representation), but also its relation to external institutional
positions. A continuum is established, with the inevitable breaks in level, between the speaker
inside the discourse and the prior image of the speaker linked with his name and his position in a
particular field. The discursive construction, the social imaginary, and the institutional authority
contribute, then, to construct a suitable ethos.

Id. at 20–21.
100
See id. at 9, 19.
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ized to hold the skeptron.101 In this way, Amossy is able to synthesize and extend the notions of prior reputational, prediscursive ethos espoused by Isocrates
and implied by Cicero with the Aristotelian notion of discursive ethos.
b. Historical Author
Related to the authority a speaker/writer enjoys as a result of his or her institutional position, and the audience’s recognition of that institutional authority, modern theorists also consider the ethotic appeal of a known, actual author.102 Referencing the work of Amossy, Carmen Marimón Llorca discusses
ethotic appeal in a particular form of journalism—columns on language.103
Llorca differentiates between the prediscursive ethotic appeal associated with
the known reputation of the author, and the discursive resources employed by
the authors to substantiate their opinions in the columns.104 Llorca refers to the
prediscursive ethos as the “empirical subject,” or the “personal and curricular
values owned by the speaker before the discourse that should help him before
the defense of a specific matter.”105
Jim Corder has written extensively on ethos,106 seeking to situate ethotic
appeal in the character of the writer.107 Differentiating his position on ethos
from that of the post-structuralists and deconstructionists who argued that text
has no meaning until such is made by the reader,108 Corder reminds scholars

101

Id. at 3. Amossy explains, “Within this framework ethos occupies a determinate place,
but it no longer qualifies as a discursive construction. It merges with the skeptron held out in
Homer to the one who is to speak next.” Id.
102 See, e.g., Carmen Marimón Llorca, Rhetorical Strategies in Discourses about Language:
The Persuasive Resources of Ethos, 2016 RES RHETORICA 68, 68 (explaining that columnists, or historical authors, may have credibility as experts).
103 See generally id. Llorca explains that columns on language are “texts published on a
regular basis and signed by the same author where a variety of issues related to language are
presented with an informative approach.” Id. at 68.
104
See id. at 74–77.
105 Id. at 75.
106 See, e.g., Jim W. Corder, Hunting for Ethos Where They Say It Can’t Be Found, 7
RHETORIC REV. 299, 299–300 (1989).
107 See id. at 300–02, 307–10, 313–14.
108 Id. at 301. Corder explains that authors
have been, whether knowingly or not, whether directly or not, part of a 2500-year-old tradition
that allowed and encouraged us to believe that ethos is in the text, that authors do exist, that they
can be in their words and own them even in the act of giving them away.

Id. In contrast,
[n]ow literary theorists both compelling and influential tell us that it is not so, that ethos exists if
at all only in the perceiving minds of readers, that authors, if they exist, do so somewhere else,
not in their words, which have already been interpreted by their new owners. Language is orphaned from its speaker; what we once thought was happening has been disrupted. Authors, first
distanced, now fade away into nothing. Not even ghosts, they are projections cast by readers.

Id.
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that someone had to “f[ind] the words.”109 Repositioning the importance of
writer for the dwelling place of ethotic appeal, Corder therefore asserts:
Ethos as we once thought we knew it is lost, and not. We’re all word-finders.
We make ethos from the words we find, and some word-finder is always leaving
words for us to find, telling an ethos toward us, crowding living time into composing time into our reading time, trying to become somebody in the midst of a
crowd, trying to get caught in language in front of others. 110

Similarly examining self-representation of the author in writing, Roger
Cherry posits a distinction between ethos and persona.111 Cherry acknowledges
the historical author and maintains that “[t]he question of ethos in the literary
text should focus on the image of the historical author that emerges from the
text itself.”112 Thus, Cherry’s position, like that of Amossy, Llorca, and Corder,
blends prediscursive and discursive notions of ethos, blurring the line between
speaker/author and speech/text.
B. Ethos in the Speech/Text
Because the dwelling of ethos cannot be neatly cabined in the speaker/writer, it must also be considered a part of the speech/text. Here, this Article
will consider what classical rhetoricians advise with respect to projecting ethos
in the speech and how modern rhetoricians envision ethos within a text.
1. Classical Notions of Ethos in the Speech
While Isocrates emphasized prediscursive ethos—that possessing good
character was essential to ethos—his rhetorical instruction did focus on both
developing good character and essential oratory skills.113 As Christopher
Rideout explains, “Paramount among these skills was the ability to speak and
persuade: ‘The gods have given us speech—the power which has civilized human life; shall we not strive to make the best use of it?’ ”114
Aristotle, in contrast, emphasized discursive ethos—that aspect of persuasion that exists when the audience understands the character of the speaker
through the speech.115 He therefore emphasized the importance of projecting
109

See id. at 309–10. He explains, “[b]efore and after the interpretive community has done
its work, before and after we have socially constructed, before and after we have intertextualized, before and after readers have responded, someone has found the words.” Id.
110 Id. at 312.
111 See, e.g., Roger D. Cherry, Ethos Versus Persona: Self-Representation in Written Discourse, 15 WRITTEN COMM. 384, 385 (1998).
112 Id. at 396.
113 See Rideout, Discoursal Self, supra note 29, at 26–30.
114 Id. at 27 (quoting James J. Murphy, The Origins and Early Development of Rhetoric, in
A SYNOPTIC HISTORY OF CLASSICAL RHETORIC 12 (James J. Murphy ed., 1983)).
115 THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at 8 (1356a1) (“The character [ethos] of the
speaker is a cause of persuasion when the speech is so uttered as to make him worthy of belief[.]”) (first alteration in original). In Ethos Dwells Pervasively: A Hermeneutic Reading of
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“intelligence, [moral] character, and good will.”116 Cicero also emphasized the
importance of the speech, noting that “much is done by good taste and style in
speaking, [so] that the speech seems to depict the speaker’s character.”117
2. Contemporary Notions of Ethos in the Speech/Text
Here, again, it is difficult to clearly differentiate between speech/text and
speaker/writer. Nonetheless, examining ethotic appeal in the speech/text provides insight for crafting the framework or template for ethos-based rhetorical
strategy.
a. Discoursal Self
Considering voice or self in legal texts, Rideout explores ethos and the
complexity of differentiating between speaker/writer and speech.118
Ethos was originally a feature of spoken rhetorics, and part of the ethos of the
spoken word would literally be the actual voice of the speaker. But ethos also
included a sense of a figurative, or constructed, voice—closely tied to the literal
voice, but not quite the same—because of the need for the orator to manipulate
the actual speaking voice. Thus, the classical concept of ethos helped to open the
way for a dual concept of voice and of the self that lay behind it. 119

Rideout posits that both voice and ethos in legal writing should be understood in a discoursal context considering the self as constructed through the
text.120 While Rideout acknowledges the historical author as the “ ‘real’ person
who lies behind the writing,”121 he asserts that ethos emerges from the discoursal representation of the historical author, existing “within the words.”122

Aristotle on Credibility, Craig R. Smith explains that a reading of The Rhetoric, informed by
a consideration of Nicomachean Ethics, “leads to the conclusion that ethos is pervasive in
the speaking event. The Rhetoric advises speakers to establish character in the proem, epilogue, and narrative of a speech liberating it from the limits placed on it in other handbooks.” Smith, Ethos Dwells Pervasively, supra note 41, at 13–14. Smith explains that “Aristotle’s treatment of the narrative was a major advancement for the theory of ethos because
he recommends that speakers utilize the narrative to ‘mention whatever bears on your own
virtue . . . or bears on the opponent’s wickedness.’ ” Id. at 14.
116 THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at 92 (1378a).
117 Michael Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, 99 DICK. L. REV. 85, 101 (1994) [hereinafter Frost, Legal Audience] (emphasis added).
118 See J. Christopher Rideout, Voice, Self, and Persona in Legal Writing, 15 J. LEGAL
WRITING INST. 67, 76 (2009).
119 Id. (citation omitted).
120 Rideout, Discoursal Self, supra note 29, at 42 (considering the self “constructed through
the discourse characteristics of a text.”) (citation omitted).
121 Id. at 41.
122 Id. at 42 (explaining that “[a]lthough readers commonly believe that the self that emerges
from the words in the text is the real self of the author, within this model, that self that
emerges is the discoursal self.”).
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b. Persona/Mask
As noted, this interplay between writer, text, and audience reveals that, in
contemporary thought, situating the dwelling of ethos exclusively in the writer,
or in the character of writer revealed in text, is a difficult line to draw. Using a
definition of self as “character as it emerges in language,”123 Baumlin and
Meyer posit an existential ethos124 explaining, “[b]y ‘character,’ we assume
both personhood and persona—that is, the self’s expressive self-identity as well
as its social presentation or mask.”125 The authors assert that such a conceptualization involves a “double movement, . . . which introjects how one ‘sees’ oneself, as well as projects how one ‘is seen’ by others.”126 And where the speaker
or writer is acting on behalf of another—a client, for example, in the Ciceronian context—one might consider a triple movement of projecting for oneself in
both an inward and outward manner while also projecting on behalf of another.127
Cherry similarly considers the notion of persona, or mask, in the context of
ethos. He differentiates between ethos, which is connected to but distinguishable from the historical author, and persona.128 Persona, in Cherry’s view, is a
“stylized mask.”129 Cherry explains that when writers craft persona in the text,
they “exercise their ability to portray the elements of a rhetorical situation to
their advantage by fulfilling or creating a certain role (or roles) in the discourse
community in which they are operating.”130
Similarly blurring the line between author and text, Corder addresses ethos
as dwelling in the text, examining the text for traces of the author.131 Corder
asserts that he wants to “believe that ethos is in the text, . . . to believe that [he]
123
124

Baumlin & Meyer, supra note 5, at 6 (citation omitted).
Id. at 4. Baumlin and Meyer consider:
[A]n existentialist presumption of an ontology of self, which “expresses” or reveals itself by
language. Within this model, the self is real—a being-in-the-world. It may need language to reveal itself, but its existence precedes discourse. Giving the “essential nature” of the self, an existentialist model seeks an ethos of “authenticity.”

Id. at 4–5 (citations omitted).
125 Id. at 6.
126 Id. The authors explain:
One hopes for sincerity, authenticity, and self-consistency in this doubled, inside/outside “showing-forth” of character. When inside and outside match, one can speak of ethos as selfrevelation: “what you see is what you get.” But there can be a slippage or disjunction between
the person and persona—again, between the inner and the outer versions of self. In that case, one
can speak of ethos as performance.

Id.
127

Complicating this a bit further and as discussed, Cicero also acknowledged the concept
of developing the ethos of both the speaker and, where the speaker represents a client, the
ethos of the client. See generally supra Section I.C.
128 See generally Cherry, supra note 111.
129 Id. at 396.
130 Id. at 399.
131
See Corder, supra note 106, at 301.
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could find others in their texts so that [he] might hope to exist for others in [his]
text so that [he] might turn [him]self over to them and thereby survive in the
text [he] leave[s].”132
Modern commentators also consider the notion of ethos being constructed
through both the speech and its impact on the audience.133 So, for example, a
social-constructionist perspective on ethos “privileges culture over self”134 and
examines the speaker as “constructed by language,” but also by “other modes
of cultural-symbolic communication/participation.”135 This socially constructed
self is a performance, a “mask,” and in this perspective, “ethos gives the ‘roles’
and ‘rules’ of the socially-constructed self.”136
The idea of a socially constructed self, one that exists through language
(speech), but also through dialogue with audience,137 reminds us that the cultural context is essential to a consideration of the dwelling of ethos.138 This Article must therefore turn to an examination of ethos in the space between the
speaker and the speech—ethos in the exchange between speaker/speech and
audience.
C. Ethos in the Exchange
Both classical and contemporary notions of ethos contribute to views of
ethos in the “exchange.” Those sources may also yield some insight into this
posited location or dwelling, but in using these theories in a practical application, the notion of audience becomes a bit more comprehensive in contemporary rhetorical analysis.139 While this complicates things a bit, this Article will

132

Id. at 314. With regard to his own character in text, Corder boldly announces, “I’m in
here. Shall I provide documentation? Are telephone numbers needed? Letters of reference?
Will the testimony of wife, librarian, and bartender suffice?” Id.
133 See, e.g., Baumlin & Meyer, supra note 5, at 5.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. (citations omitted). Baumlin and Meyer explain, “Here the self has no meaning—no
‘being’—outside of its cultural container; and, since the self ‘enacts itself’ within specific
roles and behaviors, its ‘nature’ (if such a term applies here) arises in performance. The self,
in this sense, is a mode of personation—a mask.” Id.
137 See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 328. Reynolds argues that the socially constructed self
“shifts its implications of responsibility from the individual to a negotiation or mediation
between the rhetor and the community.” She further asserts that such a shift is consistent
with the etymology of ethos, which, “in addition to its meaning as character,” is “ ‘an accustomed place’ and in the plural may refer to the ‘haunts or abodes of animals’; it also may
refer to ‘the abodes of men.’ ” Id. at 327–28 (citing Arthur B. Miller, Aristotle on Habit
(nOos) and Character (eOos): Implications for the Rhetoric?, 41 SPEECH MONOGRAPHS 309,
309–16 (1974)).
138 See id. at 329 (“One identifies an individual’s character, then, by looking to the community.”).
139
See infra Section III.A.
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ultimately use the foundation of potential loci for ethos, together with a broader
conception of audience, to examine ethotic appeal in a modern text.140
1. Classical Notions of Ethos in the Exchange
Isocrates, Aristotle, and Cicero all must have acknowledged some aspect of
ethos in the exchange between audience and speaker. For Isocrates, even
though the concept of ethos was situated in the prior reputation of the speaker,141 the audience clearly must have had some awareness of this prior reputation and must have used that awareness to invoke the ethos of the speaker for
this aspect of ethos to have been effective. Aristotle also acknowledged the
two-dimensional or discoursal nature of persuasion, emphasizing that
“ ‘[p]ersuasive’ means persuasive to a person.”142
Indeed, Aristotle recognized this discoursal element of attending to the
character of the audience and addressing ethos in the exchange as he describes
character and audience in Book 3, emphasizing that style should be “appropriate to character [to the persons of your story], since each class of men, each
type of disposition, has a language suited to it.”143 He advised speakers to be
familiar with different audiences so as to adapt to their peculiarities:
Under ‘class’ I distinguish differences of age, as boy, man, or old man; of sex,
as man or woman; of nationality, as Spartan or Thessalian. Under ‘dispositions’
I refer to those habits only which determine the character of a man’s life—for
not every habit does this. Accordingly, if the speaker uses the words which belong to a type of life, he will reproduce its character; for a rustic will not say the
same things as an educated man, nor talk in the same way. (To a certain extent
an audience will be impressed by a device which speech-writers use to nauseous
excess: ‘Who does not know . . . ?’ ‘We all know . . . ’ [t]he hearer, ashamed to
be ignorant, agrees to the fact, so as to have his part in the common
knowledge)[.]144

140

See infra Section III.B.
See supra Section I.A.
142 THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at 11 (1356b) (emphasis added); see also
KAREN BURKE LEFEVRE, INVENTION AS A SOCIAL ACT 45 (1987) (explaining that “Aristotle
defines rhetoric as the art of finding the available means of persuasion, which means that it
must involve others who are to be persuaded.”). Arguing that “Aristotle’s Rhetoric presupposes a social context,” LeFevre further notes that:
141

The three kinds of proofs—ethos, logos, pathos—by which the rhetor persuades similarly presuppose the existence of others who may or may not accept certain proofs. The audience is actively involved in building the argument in that the rhetor must look to the audience to supply
the premises of the enthymemes on which the argument rests.

Id.
143
144

THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at 198 (1408a3) (alteration in original).
Id.; see also Smith, Ethos Dwells Pervasively, supra note 41, at 13. Smith emphasizes,
Thus, an audience has character or characters; it has an ethos of its own to which speakers must
attend. In adapting, they enhance their own ethos; if they fail to adapt, their ethos will be diminished. Beyond that, however, speakers can move the audience to conform to the speaker’s ethos
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Cicero too attended to the audience reception as related to ethotic appeal,
advising advocates to calibrate their emotions to those they seek to invoke in
their audience.145
2. Contemporary Notions of Ethos in the Exchange
Modern scholars questioning the loci of ethos have similarly considered
ethos in the discourse or exchange.146 Considering the social, interactive nature
of ethos, Nedra Reynolds emphasizes the role of community in developing
ethos.147 Reynolds notes that “the concept of ethos was developed in a culture
which engaged in spoken discourse, where the actual presence of an audience
was assumed.”148 Suggesting that credibility is constructed in the “betweens,”149 Quoting LeFevre, Reynolds explains “[i]n written composition, the
social matrix of necessary others who form community and audience are less
obvious, but nevertheless present. Ethos, we might say, appears in that socially
created space, in the ‘between,’ the point of intersection between speaker or
writer and listener or reader.”150 Examining the contours of the “between”
space reveals content for the framework of ethotic appeal.

and modify the audience’s habits and values. Such identification with a leader is difficult to
achieve, but when accomplished, is the most powerful kind of persuasion.

Id.
145

2 CICERO, supra note 53, at 331 (185) (advising that “closely associated with this is that
dissimilar style of speaking which, in quite another way, excites and urges the feelings of the
tribunal towards hatred or love, ill-will or well-wishing, fear or hope, desire or aversion, joy
or sorrow, compassion or the wish to punish . . . .”); see also Frost, Legal Audience, supra
note 117, at 101. Frost explains, “ever mindful of the need to vary delivery depending on
audience and purpose, Cicero also stressed that, in order to be convincing, advocates must
sometimes abandon the restrained or temperate ethos and adopt instead the passionate emotions they are trying to instill in their audience[.]”
146 See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 2, at 326–27 (suggesting “places where responsible writers negotiate and construct ethos—sites both on the margins and from the ‘betweens.’ ”).
147 Id. at 329 (stressing that an “individual’s ethos cannot be determined outside of the space
in which it was created or without a sense of the cultural context.”).
148 Id. at 333.
149 Id.
150 Id. (citing LeFevre, supra note 142, at 45–46). Reynolds emphasizes that “[l]ocating
ethos in written texts requires attention to the mediation or negotiation that goes on in the
spaces between writers and their locations, in ‘the tension between the speaker’s private and
public self.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Reynolds therefore seeks to explore the analysis of ethos
in the betweens, questioning:
How might this idea of “the betweens” work in practice? I think it means attending to the rhetorical strategies writers use to locate themselves, their texts, and the particular discursive communities they are mediating within and between. How do writers identify themselves, claim authority, and position their projects? Are these self-identifications explicit, and if so, what is their
effect? In the spirit of ethos as a negotiated space where authority is established within and between communities, I want to suggest that being explicit is also being responsible.

Id. at 333–34.
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a. Filters
In the “exchange” space, the audience is making meaning of the ethos of
the speaker/writer.151 Modern theorists have explained the various ways in
which this construction of ethos in the between space is accomplished.152
Asserting that the term ethos “embraces three components: the speaker or
person to whom ethos and its qualities are assigned; the audience who perceives or projects these qualities onto the speaker; and the ‘rhetorical scene,’
where the speaker (and, occasionally, audience) is situated in time and
space[,]”153 Craig Meyer posits ethos in the exchange by exploring the relationship between “an authentic, core self that abides beyond culture and its influences,” and the mask of cultural influences necessarily cloaking that self.154
Meyer explains that these cultural masks operate as filters and influence how
ethos is constructed between speaker/writer and audience.155 Asserting, therefore, that ethos exists in the conceptual “between” space, Meyer similarly emphasizes the social context of ethos.
Baumlin and Meyer also consider post-structuralist notions of ethos situated between speaker and audience.156 Baumlin and Meyer note that “[i]n contemporary poststructuralist terms, the Aristotelian rhetor is reduced to an effect
of language: exactly ‘who’ the speaker ‘is’ depends on how the audience
‘reads’ him.”157 The authors thus explain the importance of audience and ex151

See, e.g., id. at 333. Reynolds explains:
Locating ethos in written texts requires attention to the mediation or negotiation that goes on in
the spaces between writers and their locations, in “the tension between the speaker’s private and
public self.” Ethos, in fact, occurs in the “between” as writers struggle to identify their own positions at the intersections of various communities and attempt to establish authority for themselves and their claims.

Id. (citations omitted).
152 See supra Section II.C.2.
153 Craig A. Meyer, From Wounded Knee to Sacred Circles: Oglala Lakota Ethos as
“Haunt” and “Wound”, 8, 36 HUMAN. 1, 5 (2019). Despite these categorizations, Meyer
nonetheless questions a clear demarcation between these loci for ethos, recognizing that,
“[a]s an analytic method, the classical-Aristotelian model seeks to pin these components and
categories down, as if ethos were reducible to the contents of a text.” Id. Notwithstanding,
such an approach “takes Aristotle’s logocentric system as a recipe book complete in itself,
neglecting the fact that his Rhetoric must itself be contextualized and historicized—that is,
situated within its own time and place.” Id. at 6.
154 Id. at 5. Meyer does acknowledge that the authentic self “wears culture as a mask of
sorts.” Id.
155 Id. Meyer explains, “[t]hrough the shutters of such masks, we see and are seen: they provide filters through which we comprehend the cultures we interact with and our respective
roles therein. These masks—our personas—are means by which we present ourselves in the
places where we situate ourselves.” Id.
156 See Baumlin & Meyer, supra note 5, at 10 (“[E]thos ‘lies between’ the speaker and audience: belonging to neither wholly . . . .”).
157 Id. The authors further explain, “Whether the rhetor deserves that trust remains an ethical
question lying outside the text. And, within this radically textualized model, the ethics of
ethos must ‘lie outside,’ since Aristotle’s Rhetoric undergirds an ethos of appearances.” Id.
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change with regard to ethos existing within the rhetorical community, noting
that “the rhetor’s ethos is built out of a speaker-audience interaction.”158
b. Shared Knowledge
Similar to filters, the concept of shared knowledge as discussed by Amossy
suggests that meaning-making is often facilitated by knowledge that the speaker/writer and audience share.159 As noted, Amossy uses rhetorical, sociological,
and pragmatic lenses to examine both discursive and authoritative aspects of
ethos.160 From the sociological position of Pierre Bourdieu that “the power of
words derives from the connection between the social function of the speaker
and his or her discourse[,]”161 Amossy asserts that the ethotic appeal of speech
is not situated in its content, but in the authority bestowed upon the speaker by
the audience.162 In contrast to this social-function consideration of ethos,
Amossy presents the pragmatists’s view of ethos as located “within verbal interaction and . . . purely internal to discourse . . . .”163
Amossy is nonetheless able to reconcile these seemingly conflicting views
by incorporating rhetorical theory, which considers persuasion in the exchange
between speaker and audience.164 Amossy, like the classical rhetoricians,
acknowledges that argumentation (and persuasion) is a function of the orator
calibrating her image to that of the audience, and vice versa.165 For Amossy,
“the interaction between the orator and [her] audience is necessarily effected
158

Id. at 10. The authors note:
Those who dwell within a rhetorical community acquire their character as rhetorical participants
from it, as it educates and socializes them. The community does this at least in part by supplying
the Aristotelian components of ethos—the judgment (phronesis), values (arete), and feelings
(eunoia) that make a rhetor persuasive to other members of the community.

Id. at 11.
159 Amossy, supra note 28, at 7 (explaining the importance of shared representations for
ethotic appeal).
160 Id. at 5.
161 Id. at 3.
162 Id. (“[T]he efficacy of speech does not depend on what it utters but on who is uttering it
and on the power with which he or she is endowed by the public.”). Amossy explains that, in
Bourdieu’s construction:
[T]he saying can be a doing only within the logic of social interaction—a shift from speech acts
to symbolic exchanges between participants who are social agents. An interactional perspective
is thus adopted. An institutional perspective is adopted as well: the verbal exchange cannot be
dissociated from the positions occupied by the participants in the field (religious, political, intellectual, literary) within which they act.

Id.
163

Id. at 5. She explains, “[c]ontemporary pragmatics diverges from the sociologist’s perspective insofar as it researches the efficacy of speech inside verbal exchange. Its various
trends are concerned not with social rituals outside of language practice but with enunciation
frameworks.” Id. at 3.
164 Id. at 5 (citing CHAIM PERELMAN & LUCIE OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A
TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., 1969)).
165
Id.

20 NEV. L.J. 877

902

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:3

through the image they form of each other [and] . . . proper functioning of the
exchange demands that to the image of the audience, there corresponds an image of the orator.”166
Using stereotype theory to explain that “verbal construction ethos has an
intrinsic social dimension,”167 Amossy asserts that speakers and their audiences
construct images of one another based upon “perceiving and understanding the
real through a preexistent cultural representation, a fixed collective schema.”168
Thus, reconciling the interplay between the speaker’s choice of rhetorical devices to construct a self in the speech and the prior authority of the speaker as
constituting ethos, Amossy asserts, “[t]he question of whether it is the institutional authority or the discursive construction that defines ethos is thus to be
understood in terms of reciprocity and complementarity.”169 Ethos is therefore
constructed in the exchange between the authoritative nature of the writer, the
writer’s ability to project that ethos to the audience, and the audience’s ability
to situate the construction of that ethos in a stock structure supported by stereotype.170
In an attempt to reconcile classical with modern views on rhetoric, Andrea
Lunsford and Lisa Ede posit what they refer to as a flawed distinction regarding the rhetor-audience relationship.171 Focusing primarily on what they view
as contemporary misapprehensions of Aristotle’s work,172 the authors challenge
a modern interpretation of the artistic pisteis (ethos, pathos, and logos) as independent means of persuasion.173 The authors assert that the pisteis are better
understood as “inseparable strands that link people engaged in discourse.”174
By uniting ethos, pathos, and logos in the enthymeme, the authors similarly
reimagine the relationship between rhetor and audience as a “dynamic” one,
166

Id. at 6. Amossy explains, “[t]he importance accorded to the audience naturally entails an
emphasis on the values and norms outside of which any dialogue proves to be impossible. It
is by drawing on common knowledge and beliefs that the orator attempts to make an interlocutor share his or her views.” Id. 5–6.
167 Id. at 8–9.
168 Id. at 7. Amossy explains, “[t]he conception that a speaker forms of the audience, whether correct or erroneous, regulates his or her endeavor to adapt to them[,] . . . [and] [t]he same
applies to the construction of the image of self which confers on the discourse a considerable
part of its authority.” Id. at 8.
169 Id. at 12.
170 Id. at 6–7.
171 Lunsford & Ede, Classical Rhetoric, supra note 7, at 84.
172 Id. at 86 (noting that “many current misconceptions grow out of a limited reading of
Aristotle’s Rhetoric.”).
173 Id. at 88 (challenging a modern scholar’s assertion that “in classical rhetorical theory
the pisteis ‘were viewed as autonomous. Each was considered as complete in itself, and
as entirely capable of effecting conviction without the aid of the others.’ ” (citation omitted)).
174 Id. The authors rely on the work of W.M.A. Grimaldi in rejecting a conceptualization of
the pisteis “as elements that can be added to discourse—rather like the ingredients in a
recipe.” Id. (citing W.M.A. GRIMALDI, ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC I, A COMMENTARY (1980);
W.M.A. GRIMALDI, STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC (1972)).
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explaining that “the goal of rhetoric is as an interactive means of discovering
meaning through language.”175 They thus dispel a conceptualization of the relationship between rhetor and audience as “antagonistic and unidirectional,” asserting, in contrast, “enthymemes occur only when speaker and audience jointly produce them . . . []they[] intimately unite speaker and audience and provide
the strongest possible proofs.”176 They therefore conclude that both Aristotelian
and modern theories view rhetoric “as providing a method by which rhetor and
audience, a self and an other [sic], together create knowledge, most often by
building on shared or prior knowledge.”177
c.

Source Relational Characteristics

Elsewhere I have argued that ethos is a relationship of trust between audience and writer (or speaker), and that this necessarily involves an exchange between reader and writer.178 In many analyses of ethos in legal writing, the focus
is on characteristics of the source that evince ethos.179 Source characteristics
associated with ethos include “intelligence, character, and good will.”180
“[W]riter[s] can demonstrate intelligence . . . by showing that [they are] informed, adept at legal research, organized, analytical, deliberate, empathetic,
practical, articulate, eloquent, precise, innovative.”181 Writers reveal character
when they demonstrate “truthfulness, candor, zeal, respect, and professionalism.”182 Because good will is associated with the apparent motivation of the
advocate, writers can evince good will by demonstrating “authority; consistency; fairness; and concern for, or similarity with, the audience.”183
I have attempted to differentiate between attributes of ethos that reflect
characteristics of the source, what I have labeled source-characteristic attributes, and aspects of ethos that reflect the relationship the author fosters with the
audience, what I have labeled source-relational attributes.184 Both source175

Id. at 90–91.
Id. at 91 (citing Lloyd F. Bitzer, Aristotle’s Enthymeme Revisited, 45 Q.J. SPEECH 399,
408 (1959)).
177
Id. at 95 (emphasis omitted).
178 Melissa H. Weresh, Morality, Trust, and Illusion: Ethos as Relationship, 9 LEGAL
COMM. & RHETORIC 229, 231 (2012); see also Anne E. Mullins, Source-Relational Ethos in
Judicial Opinions, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1089, 1109 (2019) (exploring how judges
evince source-relational attributes of ethos by using emotional intelligence).
179 See, e.g., MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND STRATEGIES IN
PERSUASIVE WRITING 125–26 (2d ed., 2008) [hereinafter SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL
WRITING].
180 THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at 92 (1378a).
181 Weresh, supra note 178, at 233 (citing SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING, supra note
179, at 148).
182 Id. (citing SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING, supra note 179, at 125–26).
183 Id.
184 Id. at 234 (asserting that “[t]hese source-relational attributes implicate the source’s ability to connect with the audience in some manner, by creating a bond based on shared information or by reinforcing a bond established between the source and the audience.”).
176
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characteristic and source-relational attributes are evinced in the text. In my
view, therefore, ethos dwells both in the text, in the source, and in the exchange.
Llorca also examines discursive ethos as a product of the exchange, or relationship between speaker/author and audience.185 Llorca explains that ethotic
argumentation exists within a social and verbal space.186 Ethotic appeal “is expressed through words backed by the echo of a real individual, but transmitted
by a strictly discursive self. It builds a discursive instance that supports the
enunciation and, in turn, produces an alocutary, an ‘intralocutor’ with whom a
communication space can be established.”187 Evidence of this ethotic appeal, in
Llorca’s view, can be found in the prediscursive ethos of the empirical subject
and in the rhetorical strategies writers employ to reveal their attitudes about
their own roles and identities.188 Ethotic rhetorical strategies include personal
deixis,189 sources cited by the writer, speech acts that reinforce the relationship
between reader and writer, and evaluative judgments the writer makes regarding content.190 To the extent that many of these strategies foster a relationship
between the writer and the audience, they fall within what I refer to as sourcerelational characteristics.
As the foregoing examination suggests, ethos likely dwells in the speaker,
the speech, and in the exchange between speaker and audience. The posited
framework for ethotic appeal will consider all haunts to better understand how
to evince ethos in order to enhance persuasion. But first, because the intended
target is written communication, this Article must explore an additional, potential wrinkle in the use of classical rhetoric to examine contemporary legal writing: the concept of audience.
III. CONTEMPORARY ETHOS IN WRITTEN COMMUNICATION
Because this Article seeks to synthesize classical and modern notions of
ethos to craft a framework for examining ethos-based rhetorical strategies in
persuasive documents, it must consider the mobility of modern texts, as contrasted with the temporality of speech in classical times, and the corresponding
185

See Llorca, supra note 102, at 77.
Id.
187 Id.
188 See id. at 79–85.
189 “Deixis is reference by means of an expression whose interpretation is relative to the
(usually) extralinguistic context of the utterance, such as: who is speaking[,] the time or
place of speaking[,] the gestures of the speaker[, and] the current location in the discourse[.]” Deixis, SIL GLOSSARY OF LINGUISTIC TERMS, https://glossary.sil.org/term/deixis
[https://perma.cc/8LKV-ENJD] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020). Person deixis is exhibited by the
pronouns used to refer to the speaker, addressee, and other referents. Person Deixis, SIL
GLOSSARY OF LINGUISTIC TERMS, https://glossary.sil.org/term/person-deixis [https://perma.
cc/4V2P-44AF] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020).
190
See Llorca, supra note 102, at 81–85.
186
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array of audience members given such mobility, in contrast with an actual and
identifiable audience in classical times. Thus, further shrouding (or illuminating) the concept of ethos is the degree to which modern rhetoricians have considered the interplay between writer and audience.
A. The Modern and Myriad Notions of Audience
The concept of audience requires an initial disclaimer—the term itself has
many meanings. As one scholar has recognized, this formally “stable referent
. . . has become fractured into audiences, into a not-always-peaceable and toooften-fragmented kingdom of terms, complete with colorful relatives, feuding
rivals, strange bedfellows, and new arrivals turning up each month.”191 At the
core of these consideration lies the distinction between real and fictional audiences.192 These varied views also consider audience outside the text as well as
inside the text.193
Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford differentiate between the audience “addressed” and the audience “invoked.”194 With regard to the addressed audience,
Ede and Lunsford point to “the concrete reality of the writer’s audience” and
the ability of the writer to envision the “attitudes, beliefs, and expectations” of
the audience.195 Thus, the concept of audience addressed correlates with the
Aristotelian and Ciceronian notion of an actual, literal audience.
The invoked audience, in contrast, is viewed as more of “a construction of
the writer, a ‘created fiction.’ ”196 Thus, differentiating the invoked audience of
the writer from the literal audience of a speaker, Ede and Lunsford explain that
191

Jack Selzer, More Meanings of Audience, in A RHETORIC OF DOING: ESSAYS ON WRITTEN
DISCOURSE IN HONOR OF JAMES L. KINNEAVY 161 (Stephen P. Witte et al. eds., 1992). The
overall complexity and resulting ambiguity surrounding the concept of audience can be illustrated by the following questions posed by Selzer:
What exactly are the differences and relationships between “evoked” and “invoked” audiences?
Or between “narratees” and “implied readers”? Or between “demographic” and “fictionalized”
audiences? Or between “fictionalized,” “intended,” “ideal,” “inscribed,” and “universal” audiences? What is the difference between “audience” and “discourse community”? What do technical writing textbooks mean by “multiple audiences”? Is it useful to conceive of audiences and
readers as distinct entities? How do texts signal the differences among all of these characters?
And how does one devise a pedagogy for “audience” that would improve reading and writing?

Id. While Selzer offers his essay as an endeavor to address these questions and to “straighten
out some of the current confusion that has converged about the term audience,” he acknowledges his inability “to succeed completely in that endeavor,” emphasizing that “the issues
are complex and slippery.” Id.
192 See, e.g., Lisa Ede & Andrea Lunsford, Audience Addressed/Audience Invoked: The Role
of Audience in Composition Theory and Pedagogy, 35 C. COMPOSITION & COMM. 155, 156
(1984) [hereinafter Ede & Lunsford, Audience Addressed] (distinguishing between actual
and imagined audiences).
193 See Introduction to A RHETORIC OF DOING, supra note 191, at 13.
194 See generally Ede & Lunsford, Audience Addressed, supra note 192.
195 Id. at 156 (emphasizing that gaining this knowledge about the audience “is not only possible (via observation and analysis) but [is] essential.”).
196
Id. at 160.
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the concept of an invoked audience does “not, of course, deny the physical reality of readers, but [underscores] that writers simply cannot know this reality
in the way that speakers can.”197 In considering the readers in the invoked audience, Ede and Lunsford explain how the writer uses rhetorical strategies in the
text to construct the role of the audience and its relationship to both writer and
text.198
Citing Walter Ong’s compelling essay “The Writer’s Audience is Always a
Fiction,” Ede and Lunsford assert that, in Ong’s view and related to the invoked audience, “the writer must construct in his imagination, clearly or vaguely, an audience cast in some sort of role . . . [and] the audience must correspondingly fictionalize itself.”199 Thus, while the invoked audience for writing
deviates from the traditional rhetorical view of a literal audience in an oratory
setting,200 it nonetheless is based upon the writer’s imagination of the audience
and her attempts to connect with it through the text.201
Building upon the work of Ede and Lunsford, Jack Selzer identifies three
categories of audience as follows: “reader in the writer,” “reader in the text,”
and “real readers.”202 The “reader in the writer” category includes both the “intended audience” and the “universal audience.”203 The intended audience is the
audience the writer envisions as he writes, and the one that therefore impacts
the production of text.204 Selzer’s notion of universal audience is a broader
construct, but also influential on the writer’s process. He describes the univer197

Id.
Id. (explaining how the writer uses “semantic and syntactic resources of language to provide cues for the reader—cues which help to define the role or roles the writer wishes the
reader to adopt in responding to the text.”).
199 Id. (citation omitted).
200 Id. at 161 (emphasizing that “the audience [of a writer] is not there in the sense that the
speaker’s audience, whether a single person or a large group, is present.”).
201 Id. at 167. Ede and Lunsford assert:
198

[I]t is only through the text, through language, that writers embody or give life to their conception of the reader. In so doing, they do not so much create a role for the reader—a phrase which
implies that the writer somehow creates a mold to which the reader adapts—as invoke it.

The authors explain:
Rather than relying on incantations, however, writers conjure their vision—a vision which they
hope readers will actively come to share as they read the text—by using all the resources of language available to them to establish a broad, and ideally coherent, range of cues for the reader.
Technical writing conventions, for instance, quickly formalize any of several writer-reader relationships, such as colleague to colleague or expert to lay reader.

Id.
202

Selzer, supra note 191, at 163.
Id.
204 Id. at 164 (explaining that the intended audience is “the more or less concrete representation of readers that the writer conceives during composition and then uses to condition his or
her developing work.”). Selzer acknowledges that the intended audience may never read the
text, but that it nonetheless informs the work of the writer. Id. (emphasizing that writers conceive of an audience and that conception “influence[s] the creative process”). Moreover,
there may be readers who are not members of the intended audience. Id. (“[S]ome of those
who do see the document . . . may not be intended readers.”).
203
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sal audience as “a theoretical collection of rational people whose values and
beliefs are grounded on rational thought [and an entity that functions as] ‘an
active participant in the argumentation process . . . .’ ”205 Selzer’s notion of
reader in the writer thus envisions audience in a manner loosely consistent with
Cicero’s advice about imagining different types of people in the audience and
calibrating speech to meet their peculiar expectations.206
Selzer’s reader in the text category is similarly synthesized from a variety
of sources.207 Selzer acknowledges that “the presence of the intended reader is
ultimately manifested in the text itself[,]”208 but that, for a writer, as opposed to
a speaker whose audience is real,209 “audiences are textual presences as well as
intended or real ones.”210 So, this concept of reader in the text pivots from the
idea that the writer has a conception of the audience in mind when drafting
(reader in the writer) to the idea that this conception of audience should be
manifested in the text itself (reader in the text).
One subcategory of reader in the text is the “the implied reader” who “is
known through the background knowledge and assumptions and values and
other human characteristics implied by the language of that text.”211 Using
Martin Luther King’s “Letter from Birmingham Jail” as an example, Selzer asserts that “King creates an implied reader in his text with the values of justice
and tolerance, a knowledge of biblical and theological and political texts, and
the attitudes of sympathy and generosity; it is this implied reader that King invites his real readers to identify with.”212 Selzer observes that King also created
other implied readers who stand in contrast to those with whom he wants his
real readers to identify.213 These Selzer characterizes as “the ‘white moderates’
referred to late in the essay that King hopes his real readers will not identify
themselves with.”214

205

Id. at 165 (citations omitted) (noting that his construction of universal audience is based
on the writings of Chaim Perelman).
206 See supra Section II.C.1.
207
See Selzer, supra note 191, at 166–69. The array of sources cited to and synthesized by
Selzer—and their implications for a theory of audience—is beyond the scope of this Article.
208 Id. at 166.
209 Id. (identifying the audience for a speech as “real people on hand for the occasion of the
speech.”).
210 Id. (emphasis added). Selzer’s conception of reader in the text is expansive and addresses
various distinctions between reader and audience which fall along the following dimensions:
(a) how abstract the audience or reader is made out to be, (b) how involved or active the audience or reader is in the text itself, (c) how extensively the reader or audience influences invention, and (d) the extent to which the concept reflects a structuralist or poststructuralist view of
language and text.

Introduction to A RHETORIC OF DOING, supra note 191, at 13–14.
211 Selzer, supra note 191, at 166.
212 Id. at 167.
213 Id.
214
Id.
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Also falling within the category of reader in the text is the “informed”
reader, who is “something of a textual ideal that presupposes a general competence . . . [i]n the language of the text,” and also someone who is “actively engaged in understanding a particular text.”215
Selzer’s final category is “real readers,” or actual readers who truly exist.
Here, again, Selzer’s work draws on a variety of sources.216 Recognizing that
real readers may or may not be intended or invoked readers, Selzer distinguishes between single audiences, who “come to a text for the same reason,”
and multiple audiences who “have to do with the multiple tasks—or multiple
reading behaviors—that various readers may require of a text, whether those
behaviors are implied in texts or assumed in fact by real, empirical readers.”217
Selzer also distinguishes between real readers who are passive receivers, “uncritical receptacles for taking in messages,”218 and readers who are more active.
More active readers may include those who are resistant, who therefore “resist
the roles set out for them [and also] resist the entire ideology of a text.”219
These resisting readers are important for this Article’s consideration of ethos
and persuasion, as “the notion of the resisting reader may be implicit in the
very notion of persuasion in our culture, a notion that assumes readers who
carefully guard—resist—ideological positions that are under siege by a rhetor.”220
Having considered modern notions of writer and audience, this Article will
turn to consider how ethos may be manifested in a text. But we, reader and I,
215

Id. at 168–69. Selzer explains:
The informed reader is at once a communal reader predisposed by the linguistic codes and conventions agreed on by an interpretive community and an individual reader in the world who is
seeking to understand those codes completely. Or to put it in the terms of linguistic theory, the
informed reader is a real reader striving to bring performance into conformity with competence.

Id.
216

Id. (“[U]nderstanding the nature of real readers is by no means uncomplicated.”).
Id. at 170.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 171.
220 Id. Selzer explains that “[r]esisting readers resist every kind of textual move; they move
through discourse with a kind of skepticism or suspicion, implicitly counter the text at every
opportunity, and finally may subjugate it to personal proclivities or counterideologies.” Id.
Selzer’s thorough examination of the many meanings of audience provides a rich array of
practical application. As Witte et al. observe:
217

Selzer’s treatment of audience demonstrates—in a way and to an extent not found elsewhere—
how extremely rich and dynamic is audience as a theoretical construct. Not only does Selzer
suggest that audience must be conceptualized in terms of interactions that obtain across his major categories, but he also suggests that any theoretical accommodation of audience will have to
treat both the interactions that may obtain within a given class and the multidimensional nature
of consequent interactions in relation to, for example, invention. By bringing some semblance of
order to an area that on first glance seems to defy order, Selzer has made simpler the tasks of the
discourse or rhetorical theorist, the discourse analyst, and the classroom teacher by representing
clearly and comprehensively the complex nature of the problems with which each must deal.

Introduction to A RHETORIC OF DOING, supra note 191, at 14.
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have now moved beyond looking only for Aristotelian notions regarding source
characteristics of ethos, including how the writer’s intelligence, character, and
good will are evinced in the text. We are also now able to examine how a text
might manifest notions of both possession and appearance of the character of
both the writer and the client (or claim). Further, we can explore how ethos is
manifested in the text, and in the exchange between writer and varying notions
of audience.
B. Examining Ethos in Modern Text
1. Framework for Ethotic Analysis
A synthesis of the foregoing classical and contemporary views on ethotic
location yields the following framework:
Ethos in the Speaker/Writer
•
•
•

Prior Reputation (Isocrates, Cicero)
Institutional Authority (Amossy)
Historical Author/Empirical Subject (Corder, Cherry, Llorca)

Ethos in the Speech/Text
•
•
•

Intelligence, Moral Character, Goodwill (Aristotle)
Discursive Ethos (Aristotle, Cicero, Rideout)
Persona/Mask
▪ Of Author (Aristotle, Cicero, Baumlin and Meyer, Cherry, Corder)
▪ Of Client (Cicero)

Ethos in the Exchange
•
•
•
•

Audience Awareness of Prior Character (Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero)
Filters (Baumlin and Meyer)
Shared Knowledge (Amossy, Lunsford, and Ede)
Source Relational Characteristics (Weresh, Llorca)

Notwithstanding this effort to identify potential ethotic locations, one must
keep in mind that the lines differentiating between writer, text, audience, and
exchange are blurred at best. Nonetheless, armed with these potential considerations, this Article will now consider ethos in one piece of modern advocacy—Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent from the denial of certiorari in Pennsylvania v. Dunlap,221 which is reproduced below.

221

Pennsylvania v. Dunlap, 555 U.S. 964, 964–67 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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2. Ethotic Target: Dunlap
************
555 U.S. 964
October 14, 2008
No. 07–1486. PENNSYLVANIA v. DUNLAP. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 596 Pa. 147, 941 A.2d 671.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY joins, dissenting.
North Philly, May 4, 2001. Officer Sean Devlin, Narcotics Strike Force,
was working the morning shift. Undercover surveillance. The neighborhood?
Tough as a three-dollar steak. Devlin knew. Five years on the beat, nine months
with the Strike Force. He’d made fifteen, twenty drug busts in the neighborhood.
Devlin spotted him: a lone man on the corner. Another approached. Quick
exchange of words. Cash handed over; small objects handed back. Each man
then quickly on his own way. Devlin knew the guy wasn’t buying bus tokens.
He radioed a description and Officer Stein picked up the buyer. Sure enough:
three bags of crack in the guy’s pocket. Head downtown and book him. Just another day at the office.
*

*

*

That was not good enough for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which held
in a divided decision that the police lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant. The court concluded that a “single, isolated transaction” in a high-crime area was insufficient to justify the arrest, given that the officer did not actually see
the drugs, there was no tip from an informant, and the defendant did not attempt
to flee. 596 Pa. 147, 159, 941 A.2d 671, 679 (2007). I disagree with that conclusion, and dissent from the denial of certiorari. A drug purchase was not the only
possible explanation for the defendant’s conduct, but it was certainly likely
enough to give rise to probable cause.
The probable-cause standard is a “nontechnical conception that deals with
the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370
(2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). What is required is simply “a reasonable ground for belief of guilt,” id., at 371, (same)—a “probability, and not a
prima facie showing, of criminal activity,” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235
(1983) (same). “[A] police officer may draw inferences based on his own experience in deciding whether probable cause exists,” Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 700 (1996), including inferences “that might well elude an untrained
person,” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
On the facts of this case, I think the police clearly had probable cause to arrest the defendant. An officer with drug interdiction experience in the neighborhood saw two men on a street corner—with no apparent familiarity or prior interaction—make a quick hand-to-hand exchange of cash for “ ‘small objects.’ ”
596 Pa., at 150, 941 A.2d, at 673. This exchange took place in a high-crime
neighborhood, known for drug activity, far from any legitimate businesses. Per-
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haps it is possible to imagine innocent explanations for this conduct, but I cannot come up with any remotely as likely as the drug transaction Devlin believed
he had witnessed. In any event, an officer is not required to eliminate all innocent explanations for a suspicious set of facts to have probable cause to make an
arrest. As we explained in Gates, “[i]n making a determination of probable
cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or
‘guilty,’ but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.” 462 U.S., at 244, n. 13.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court emphasized that the police did not actually see any drugs. 596 Pa., at 159, 941 A.2d, at 679. But Officer Devlin and his
partner were conducting undercover surveillance. From a distance, it would be
difficult to have a clear view of the small objects that changed hands. As the
Commonwealth explains in its petition for certiorari, the “classic” drug transaction is a hand-to-hand exchange, on the street, of cash for small objects. Pet. for
Cert. 5–8. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision will make it more difficult for the police to conduct drug interdiction in high-crime areas, unless they
employ the riskier practice of having undercover officers actually make a purchase or sale of drugs.
The Pennsylvania court also noted that the defendant did not flee. 596 Pa.,
at 159, 941 A.2d, at 679. Flight is hardly a prerequisite to a finding of probable
cause. A defendant may well decide that the odds of escape do not justify adding
another charge to that of drug possession. And of course there is no suggestion
in the record that the defendant had any chance to flee—he was caught redhanded.
Aside from its importance for law enforcement, this question has divided
state courts, a traditional ground warranting review on certiorari. This Court’s
Rule 10(b). The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that an “experienced narcotics officer” had probable cause to make an arrest when—in a vacant lot in a
high-drug neighborhood—he “saw defendant and his companion give money to
[a] third person in exchange for small unknown objects.” State v. Moore, 181
N.J. 40, 46–47, 853 A.2d 903, 907 (2004). The Rhode Island Supreme Court
reached the same conclusion in a case where the defendants—through their car
windows—exchanged cash for a small “bag of suspected narcotics.” State v.
Castro, 891 A.2d 848, 851–854 (2006). In contrast, the Colorado Supreme
Court held that a hand-to-hand exchange of unknown objects did not give the
police probable cause to make an arrest, even where one of the men was a
known drug dealer. People v. Ratcliff, 778 P.2d 1371, 1377–1378 (1989). All
these cases have unique factual wrinkles, as any probable-cause case would, but
the core fact pattern is the same: experienced police officers observing hand-tohand exchanges of cash for small, unknown objects in high-crime neighborhoods.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court speculated that such an exchange could
have been perfectly innocent. But as Judge Friendly has pointed out, “[j]udges
are not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free.”
United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1300 (CA2 1977). Based not only on
common sense but also his experience as a narcotics officer and his previous
work in the neighborhood, Officer Devlin concluded that what happened on that
street corner was probably a drug transaction. That is by far the most reasonable
conclusion, even though our cases only require it to be a reasonable conclusion.
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I would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
************

3. Ethotic Analysis
This Article will now consider the development of ethos in the foregoing
text. With such limited text, our dive will not necessarily be deep, but will illustrate the plausibility of the posited loci for ethotic appeal: ethos of the writer,
ethos of the client, ethos of the text, and ethos within the exchange.
a. Ethos in the Writer
We turn first to ethos of the writer—Chief Justice Roberts. Roberts has a
prior reputation as a longstanding judicial officer and author of important legal
texts. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, writing as an officer of the
Court, possesses the type of institutional, authoritative appeal imagined in the
classical view by Isocrates and Cicero and in the modern view by Amossy and
Llorca.222 But, along the lines of Amossy’s and Llorca’s notions of ethos in the
exchange, Roberts is also able to project an authoritative construct of the
ethotic appeal of judges in general, and himself in particular, through the text.
For example, he substantiates the authority of the judicial position in his use of
the following quote: “Judges are not required to exhibit a naiveté from which
ordinary citizens are free.”223
In keeping with the notion of the historical author or empirical subject of
Corder, Cherry, and Llorca, Roberts’s authorial presence is evident in the text:
“I disagree with that conclusion, and dissent from the denial of certiorari.”224
“On the facts of this case, I think the police clearly had probable cause to arrest
the defendant.”225 Perhaps revealing his attitude toward his role as an officer of
the Court along the lines of Llorca’s ethos-based rhetorical strategies, Roberts
writes, “[p]erhaps it is possible to imagine innocent explanations for this conduct, but I cannot come up with any remotely as likely as the drug transaction
Devlin believed he had witnessed.”226 He also exhibits attributes of ethos by
carefully organizing and substantiating his assertions.
b. Ethos in the Text
Roberts, while writing as a judicial officer, employs the persona or mask of
a hardboiled crime fiction piece: “The neighborhood? Tough as a three-dollar
222

See supra Section II.A.
Dunlap, 555 U.S. at 967 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Stanchich,
550 F.2d 1294, 1300 (CA2 1977)).
224 Id. at 965 (emphasis added).
225 Id. (emphasis added).
226
Id.
223
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steak.”227 While this technique prompts ethotic appeal in the exchange as discussed below, it also evinces the discursive ethotic appeal of a persona. It is
one that has been crafted to comport with Roberts’s legal conclusion—that the
arresting officer had probable cause to make the stop, just as seasoned detectives in hardboiled crime novels predictably solve the crime. Of course, that
persona will resonate with individuals who agree with the conclusion. It will
not with those who view it as disrespectful of the defendant, state courts, and
crime-ridden neighborhoods.
Roberts employs several other devices to evince ethos in the text. Setting
up his discoursal self, he begins by framing the law in a manner that supports
his ultimate position. Then, after laying out the test for probable cause, Roberts
emphasizes: “What is required is simply ‘a reasonable ground for belief of
guilt.’ ”228 His assertions are well supported by authority evincing the Aristotelean notion of intelligence, and he artfully discredits the opposing position
with the following counterarguments:
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision will make it more difficult for the
police to conduct drug interdiction in high-crime areas, unless they employ the
riskier practice of having undercover officers actually make a purchase or sale
of drugs. The Pennsylvania court also noted that the defendant did not flee.
Flight is hardly a prerequisite to a finding of probable cause. . . . And of course
there is no suggestion in the record that the defendant had any chance to flee—
he was caught redhanded.229

With respect to the ethos of the client, we must recognize that Roberts’s
dissent rules in favor of the State. We can therefore look to Roberts’s characterization of Officer Devlin, an agent of the State, and his construction of Devlin’s
character for evidence of the ethos of the client. Roberts’s dissent highlights the
credibility of Officer Devlin’s intuition and judgment as sufficient for probable
cause: “Devlin knew.”230 Supporting his belief that “the police clearly had
probable cause to arrest the defendant,”231 Roberts characterizes Devlin as
“[a]n officer with drug interdiction experience in the neighborhood”232 who
witnessed the interaction “in a high-crime neighborhood known for drug activity, far from any legitimate businesses,”233 lending credibility and ethos to the
government’s position. The credibility of Devlin is further supported in Justice
Roberts’s conclusion on probable cause, where Roberts tethers his own legal
conclusion to Devlin’s credibility:
Based not only on common sense but also his experience as a narcotics officer
and his previous work in the neighborhood, Officer Devlin concluded that what
227
228
229
230
231
232
233

Id. at 964.
Id. at 965 (citation omitted).
Id. at 966 (citation omitted).
Id. at 964.
Id. at 965.
Id.
Id.
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happened on that street corner was probably a drug transaction. That is by far
the most reasonable conclusion, even though our cases only require it to be a
reasonable conclusion.234

c.

Ethos in the Exchange

Regarding ethos in the exchange, we must first consider the audience for
the opinion. Note that this is a dissent from a denial of certiorari. The intended/addressed audience of Ede and Lunsford, and the “informed” audience of
Selzer,235 consists of both the general legal public, including state courts that
routinely rule on Dunlap-style probable cause issues and the lawyers who represent clients in this area, as well as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court from
which the petition for certiorari arose. In Selzer’s categorization, implied readers include those who share Roberts’s view of the Fourth Amendment and with
whom assertions such as the following likely resonate: “Perhaps it is possible
to imagine innocent explanations for this conduct, but I cannot come up with
any remotely as likely as the drug transaction Devlin believed he had witnessed.”236 Implied readers are also likely favorably influenced by the hardboiled crime persona that substantiates Roberts’s conviction on the issue of
probable cause.
Implied readers also most certainly include resistant readers whose views
on the Fourth Amendment stand in contrast with Roberts’s position, and for
whom Roberts may have had the following passages in mind: “In any event, an
officer is not required to eliminate all innocent explanations for a suspicious set
of facts to have probable cause to make an arrest.”237 “That is by far the most
reasonable conclusion, even though our cases only require it to be a reasonable
conclusion.”238
With respect to all types of audience, Roberts must have had an intention
of developing a connection with the audience by employing the crime-genrestyle introduction. This stylistic device evokes Amossy’s notion of stereotype
and shared knowledge and Baumlin and Meyer’s notion of filters. The stylistic
device prompts the use of stereotyping, both of the narrator who, in this type of
genre, solves the crime with ease, and of the opposing party, or defendant. Situated in this unusual genre, at least in judicial opinion writing, the audience filters information, reading the narrator in a manner that may therefore comport
with the historical author’s conclusion.
The use of humor, literary references, and tropes establish both sourcecharacteristic and source-relational ethos.239 Roberts’s use of a fairly well234
235
236
237
238
239

Id. at 967.
See supra Section III.A.
Dunlap, 555 U.S. at 965 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 965–66.
Id. at 967.
See generally Weresh, supra note 178.
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known literary genre evinces cleverness, a source-characteristic example of
ethos, and establishes a relationship based on shared knowledge between writer
and reader, a source-relational characteristic.240 The use of this technique also
resonates with Baumlin’s theory of character emerging in text, and the previously discussed triple movement of projecting for oneself in both an inward
and outward manner, while also projecting on behalf of another. That is because Roberts has employed ethos-based strategies to build the character of the
judicial writer, the crime-genre narrator, and also the voice, and ethos, of the
arresting officer.241
Of course, the novel, crime-genre technique does not evince ethos for all
audiences. It likely does not resonate with the resistant readers who view the
case quite differently. In fact, for those readers, such a technique may undermine the ethotic appeal of the author as it suggests he has not taken the case, or
the rights of criminal defendants, seriously.
CONCLUSION
Both classical rhetoricians and modern scholars agree that effective legal
persuasion depends on developing ethotic appeal. While the foregoing has been
a limited evaluation of the potential loci for ethos in a written text, it does reveal a promising framework for future evaluation of ethos-based rhetorical
strategies as they may be situated in the writer, text, and exchange. The template further provides an author with a framework for considering posited loci
to reinforce the impact of the ethotic appeal of the writer, of the text, and in the
exchange taking place between author and audience.

240

Helen A. Anderson, Police Stories, 111 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 19, 20 (2016). Anderson
notes that “[t]he Dunlap dissent is perhaps the most obvious expression of the link between
popular culture and the narratives in judicial opinions.” Id. I have asserted that literary references and inside jokes are a form of gesture from the writer to the reader, a source relational
form of ethos that establishes connection and trust. See Weresh, supra note 178, at 260–65.
Anderson similarly observes that “the less literary police narratives found in appellate opinions also tap into prevalent cultural stories about the police—stories of hardworking, embattled officers.” Anderson, supra at 20. (emphasis added).
241 Mark K. Osbeck, What Is “Good Legal Writing” and Why Does It Matter?, 4 DREXEL L.
REV. 417, 445 (2012). Osbeck notes that a writer “may make effective use of a voice that is
not the writer’s own, but rather a character the writer wants the reader to identify with.” Id.
In the introductory scene Roberts set in Dunlap, “he cleverly employs the point of view as
well as the voice of the arresting officer in order to help the reader appreciate the officer’s
perspective on whether there was probable cause to make an arrest . . . .” Id.
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